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Abstract: We present a field study of social learning. The setting is a pair of adjacent 
fast food restaurants serving very similar cuisine whose main clientele are the students at 
a nearby major university. We observed whether an uninformed customer's choice of 
restaurant depends on the relative queue lengths at the two restaurants. Observations were 
made at two separate observation periods, the start of the academic year, when a 
significant proportion of customers had little or no experience with either restaurant, and 
the middle of the year, when most customers already had previous experience with the 
restaurants. It is found, consistent with the social learning hypothesis, that relative queue 




*Dept of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel 




Understanding the extent to which rational agents infer and act upon information 
from the behavior of others is essential for the analysis of many important economic 
phenomena. In particular, the literature on social learning by rational agents, beginning 
with the seminal papers of Welch (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992, 
1998), and Bennerjee (1992), shows that such learning can lead to herding or information 
cascades.  
In the classical cascade paradigm, a sequence of decision makers, with common 
preferences, faces a choice between one of two options, A and B, and each agent receives 
an independent private binary signal about which choice provides the higher payoff and 
observes all her predecessors’ choices. In this example, once one of the options is 
observed to have been chosen at least twice more than the other, it is optimal for all 
subsequent agents to choose it even if this choice contradicts their own signal. Thus all 
available information is not aggregated and, consequently, all agents may wind up 
making the wrong choice.  
For example, if the first two agents choose action A, this reveals two signals in favor 
of A (assuming that the second person will follow her own signal). Then, each 
subsequent agent thinks that A is better even if her own signal favors B and thus also 
chooses A. More generally, when action and signal spaces are finite and each signal is 
imperfect, rational agents eventually herd, ignoring their own information and imitating 
others. Various studies have shown that these results may be modified or reversed if 
action or signal spaces are sufficiently “rich” or if agents are incompletely informed 





and Rabin (2009) have shown that when agents have limited rationality and believe that 
predecessors act only on the basis of their own signal (or put “excessive” weight on their 
own signal), social learning can lead to worse outcomes than if agents only act on their 
own information.  
These theoretical predictions have received support in the laboratory. A pioneering 
study supporting the information cascade models is Anderson and Holt (1997); see also 
Anderson and Holt (1996), Hung and Plott (2001); Çelen and Kariv (2004, 2005) and 
Alevy, Haigh and List (2007). Yet, the basic prediction of social learning has received 
little support in the field, which is what we do in the current paper.  
The setting is a pair of adjacent fast food restaurants in Israel serving the same type of 
food whose main clientele are the students of a nearby major university.  The restaurants 
are privately owned and are not part of a chain. In this setting we observed whether an 
uninformed customer's choice of restaurant reflects the choices of previous customers, as 
social learning theory would suggest. Specifically, consumer behavior was observed 
during two separate observation periods.  At the first observation period, at the beginning 
of the academic year, as we argue below, a significant proportion of customers had little 
or no experience with either restaurant and thus had reason to look to other (presumably 
more experienced) customers' choices to learn about the relative qualities of the two 
stores. By contrast, at the second observation period, the overwhelming majority of 
customers already had considerable experience with the restaurants and were therefore 
less likely to be influenced by others' choices. Thus this setting allows us to distinguish 
between genuine social learning and merely imitative “copycat” behavior (or the desire 





learning hypothesis is supported if imitative behavior is more pronounced during the first 
period (when consumers have a greater need for information) than in the second period 
(when they do not). 
 
What are consumers Learning? 
In the theoretical and experimental studies cited above, it is generally assumed that 
consumers have identical preferences and differ only with respect to their information. 
This does not seem to be the case in our setting. In particular, at the second observation 
period, when presumably most or all consumers’ preferences are already well formed, 
they divide between the two restaurants (instead of herding at only one of them), 
suggesting that experienced consumers have different preferences between them. Instead, 
we conceive of inexperienced consumers at the first observation period as learning about 
their own tastes. The following is a schematic way to think of this. Suppose any 
individual has an ex ante preference for restaurant A with the probability p, where p is an 
unknown parameter with a prior of 0.5 common to all consumers (i.e., an inexperienced 
consumer with no additional information considers it equally likely that she will prefer 
either restaurnat). If such an individual has no additional information, she will choose one 
restaurant at random. Suppose she knows that a fraction alpha of consumers is informed 
(i.e., has already learned which store they prefer), and that this information is correlated 
with her preferences. Then if an uninformed consumer is Bayesian and observes that 
more consumers choose restaurant A than restaurant B, she should update her posterior of 
p to be >0.5.  





these restaurants has a prior of 0.5 that she will prefer restaurant A. She also knows that 
about 2/3 of students are already informed about their own preference (this is a three-year 
college). So if she observes more students choosing A than B, then (assuming she does 
not perfectly distinguish between freshmen and older students), her posterior probability 
about p should be updated to p>0.5. It follows that at the first observation period, an 
inexperienced (Bayesian) freshman who observes a longer queue at restaurant A than B 
will infer that her own preference is more likely to be for store A and join the queue for 
store A. By contrast, an experienced student’s choice will not depend on relative queue 
lengths. Therefore, if such a student has learned that she prefers restaurant B she will 
choose it even if the queue for store A is longer. This implies that, at the beginning of the 
year, when restaurant A has a longer queue than B, a randomly selected consumer is 
more likely to go to restaurant A than if restaurant B has a longer one (and similarly for 
restaurant B when it has a longer queue).  
This can lead to herding behavior on the part of inexperienced students. Suppose an 
inexperienced student observes a customer at restaurant A and no customers at restaurant 
B. The customer at restaurant A may be an inexperienced consumer who chose store A 
by chance, or an experienced consumer who actually has some private information 
regarding the relative quality of the restaurants. So it is rational for the new student to 
choose A as well. By contrast, at the second observation period, almost all students are 
probably already experienced. Therefore the queue length should have much less 
influence on a consumer’s choice.   
To support the intuition, consider music purchase. Say that you decide to 





good first step might be to go online and see what the most popular artists/albums are--
and start there. With time, you will probably develop your own taste and learn more 
about your own preferences, and will have less need for others' recommendation 
(Salganik, Dodds and Watts, 2006).  
 
2. Detailed Description of the Field study 
The two fast food restaurants are situated literally back to back (see photos) in an 
outdoor food court located right outside the main entrance to the Bar Ilan University 
Campus near Tel Aviv – a large University in Israel with a student body of almost 
20,000. The location of the food court, Nve Ilan is a quiet residential area, not very 
centrally located. Each of the restaurants serves both falafel and shwarma sandwiches in 
pita bread, and are popular with the University students. The restaurants are also 
frequented by local residents, but the majority of patrons are students (and some faculty 
and administrative staff). As can be seen from the photos, the restaurants are outwardly 
very similar, have almost identical décor and signs and the food and service are very 
similar. As is typical of such restaurants, the store-front of each restaurant has a shelf 
containing bowls of condiments which patrons can add to their pita sandwiches.  
Importantly, there is a common seating area in front of the restaurants which is used 
by patrons of both restaurants. This rules out the possibility that choice of restaurant is 
dictated by the desire to dine in larger company. Directly adjacent to these restaurants is 






The data collection procedure was very simple. Research assistants were seated in 
the seating area in front of the restaurants during the key hours, 11 AM to 3 PM, which 
are the busiest hours. Whenever a new customer approached one of the restaurants to be 
served, the number of customers standing in front of each restaurant (just prior to her 
arrival) was recorded. These included customers waiting to be served as well as 
customers who had already been served and were standing at the storefront eating their 
sandwiches or adding condiments to them. Then the restaurant chosen by the new 
customer was recorded. If several customers arrived in a group and chose the same 
restaurant, they were recorded as a single observation, unless they went to different 
restaurants, in which case they were recorded as separate observations.  
  It is important to note that the waiting time is very short in both restaurants; In 
77% of the cases we measured, a customer was served within less than a minute (even if 
there were four or five customers in line), and in only 6% of the cases were customers 
made to wait more than 2 minutes for service. This suggests that shortening waiting time 
is probably not a significant consideration in consumer choice.  
We observed customer behavior during two different time periods. The first 
period was during the first two weeks of the academic year, in October 2009. This is the 
time when about a third of the students – the freshmen - are new to the campus and 
presumably most of them have never eaten at the restaurants before.  
The second observation period was in the middle of the academic year 
(specifically mid April), when all potential student have already had plenty of recent 





In other words, on average customers come to the field with more informative private 
signals at the second observation period than at the first one.  Theory would therefore 
predict less 'information cascading' during the second than the first time period. 
 
3. Results 
An observation is the choice of the restaurant by a newly arrived customer, 
presented as a function of the number of people in queue A and in queue B at the time of 
her arrival. The number of observations in each queue situation is presented in Tables 1a 
for the beginning of the year and 1b for the middle of the year. The total number of 
observations is 1,324 for the beginning of the year and 1,153 for the middle of the year.  
The percentage of observations in which restaurant A was chosen as a function of 
the number of people in restaurant A and B is presented in Table 2a for the first 
observation period and in Table 2b for the second period.  
Recall that our purpose is to determine whether the difference between the 
number of customers in each queue affects consumer choice. Figure 1 presents this data. 
At the beginning of the year, 366 (63%) out of 580 of arriving customers went to A when 
there were more customers in restaurant A,. When there were more customers in B, only 
189 (40%) out of 478 went to A. A binomial test of proportions reveals that the 
difference is statistically significant (z=7.64, p<.001). At the end of the year, the numbers 
are 192 (49%) out of 389 who go to A when there are more people in A, and 202 (47%) 
out of 431 who do so when there are more people in B. The difference at the end of the 






Figure 2 presents the fraction of new customers which chose restaurant A, as a 
function of difference between the number of customers in each queue, for the two 
observation periods. The figure shows that effect of the difference in queue length is 
more pronounced at the first observation period. 
  To more formally test whether the trend shown in Figure 2 is statistically 
significant, we ran a logit regression where the dependent variable gets the value 1 if 
restaurant A is chosen and zero if store B is chosen. The independent variables are 
Additional,  period  and an interaction variable, Additional ۛ • period. The variable 
Additional measures the effect of an additional customer at the queue for restaurant A on 
customer choice. Period is a dummy variable which equals 0 for observations at the first 
period and 1 for observations at the second period. Additional ۛ • period is the interaction 
effect of these variables (their product). The marginal effects associated with the 
variables in the regression are listed in Table 3a for different base values of A-B, where 
A-B is the difference between the number of customers at restaurant A and the number at 
B.   Thus Additional measures the marginal effect of an additional customer at A on the 
probability of choosing store A at the first observation period while the sum of Additionalۛ 
and the interaction variable Additional ۛ • period,  measures the effect of an additional 
customer at the second period. The marginal effects of Additional and the interaction 
variable are both highly significant (p values of less than .01). The table shows that for all 
listed values of A-B, an additional customer increases the probability of choosing 
restaurant B by between about 3.4 percent to about 4.8 percent at the first period.  In 
sharp contrast, the sum of Additional and the interaction variable is only about -0.001 in 





Table 3b gives the results of the same regression when the dependent variable is 
the probability of choosing store B as a function of the difference B-A.  The results are 
very similar to those in Table 3a. Thus we conclude that the difference in the number of 
customers has a highly significant effect at the first period but a negligible effect at the 




In this paper we present evidence in support of the economic theory of social 
learning. In our empirical setting, uninformed consumers' preferences are hypothesized to 
be correlated with those of other, more informed consumers. As predicted by theory, we 
find that social learning is important at the initial stage, when new consumers are poorly 
informed about their preferences between different products. At this stage, such a 
consumer uses the observed choices of other consumers as a source of information about 
her preferences. Once she has gained sufficient personal experience, she ignores these 
outside signals. Hence the simple social interactions in our setting seem to be consistent 
with the theoretical model. 
As the development of social networks accelerates the flow of information in 
society, understanding social learning becomes increasingly important. Nevertheless, 
there is little research testing the social learning hypothesis outside of the laboratory. It is 
thus encouraging that our results offer strong support for the theory in a real world 








  # in queue-B 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0  106  79 62 38 20 13  1  1 
1  101  69 68 30 17  2  6   
2  84 60 47 33    24 10  1 
3  39 31 36 25 33  3  3   
4  26 17 28 24 18 25  4  5 
5  13 2 28  11  20 1     
6  5 3 3 9 2 2     
7  1  8  5    3  














  # in queue-B 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
0  143  71  49  45  22  6 4 7 3 4   
1  75 88 46 39 10  6  4  7  4     
2  31  52  61 7 10 8  5  4  2     
3  15  28  28  19  17  9 3 4 2 1 1 
4  17 18 14 13 16  9    2  2  3  1 
5  1 4 9 3 2 2 7    1     
6  7 5 4 6 2 4 3 5       
7  5 8 8 2 2 4 3    1     
8  2    6  1  1  1    



















Table 1a (top figure, beginning of year) and 1b (bottom figure, end of year): Number of 
observations as a function of the number of people in each queue. For example, in Table 
1a we have 60 observations in which when the new person approached the restaurants 







  # in queue-B 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0  58 46 39 21 60 31  0  0 
1  59 58 56 27 35  100  83   
2  57 53 68 30    33 70  0 
3  59 61 61 52 33 67 67   
4  88 53  0  75 83  8 100 0 
5  69 100 82  36  65  0     
6  100 100  1000 33  100 100     
7  0   63  60     100   














  # in queue-B 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
0  53 48 53 40 55 50 75 57  100  75   
1  52 57 43 49 50 50 25    0     
2  42 52 61 57    88 60 50 50     
3  33 43 54 63 29 33 33    50  0  0 
4  47 50 57 62 44 44    50 50 67  0 
5  100  50  33  67  0  0    0    
6  43  60  100 67  100 75       
7  40  50  0     67   100     
8  0     17       100    


















Table 2a (top figure, beginning of year) and 2b (bottom figure, end of year): Percentage 
of observations that ended up with the person choosing restaurant A as a function of the 



















































































Table 3a: The marginal effects associated with the variables in the logit regression for 
different base values of A-B, where A-B is the difference between the number of 
customers at restaurant A and the number at B. Additional measures the marginal effect 
of an additional customer at B on the probability of choosing store B at the first 
observation period while the sum of Additionalۛ and the interaction variable Additional ۛ • 
period,  given in column 4, measures the effect of an additional customer at the second 
period. Standard errors are in parentheses. Three asterisks indicate a p value of less than 


















































































Table 3b: The marginal effects associated with the variables in the logit regression for 
different base values of B-A. Additional measures the marginal effect of an additional 
customer at B on the probability of choosing store B at the first observation period while 
the sum of Additionalۛ and the interaction variable Additional ۛ • period,  given in column 4, 
measures the effect of an additional customer at the second period. Standard errors are in 













Figure 1: The percantage of cusomers going to restaurant A depending on whether there 
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